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Abstract 
The paper investigated the real and accrual earnings discretionary behaviour of Malaysian IPO firms 
contemporaneously in terms of nature, direction and quantum. It investigates the discretionary behaviour 
according to year of listing, industrial sectors, individual accounting items and the impact of ownership retention. 
The sample consists of 253 Malaysian IPO firms from 2002-2013. The 1991,modified Jones and Roychowdhury, 
(2006) cross sectional models were used to investigate accrual and real activity discretionary behaviour. The 
results indicate significant positive abnormal real earnings management and a significant difference in earning 
management proxies across industrial sectors. Retained ownership is negatively associated with earnings 
management proxies which seem to support the alignment hypothesis. The study justifies the merging of Main 
and Second boards and recommend tightening of regulations to constrain real activity discretionary behaviour. It 
provides academics, analysts, regulators and other gatekeepers with better understanding of earnings 
management around the IPO event. 
Keywords: Real and Accrual Earnings Management, Initial Public Offering, ownership Retention 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the global finance and accounting scene dramatically changed. First 
was  the Internet debacle in 2000, then the stock markets that was hitherto bullish became bearish, and 
companies that were engaged in pernicious earnings management that tried to obscure their accounting reports 
through various earnings management practices became exposed and precarious. The corporate meltdown that 
followed culminated into heavy losses to investors. These scandals weakened the integrity of the capital market 
in the eyes of investors and other stakeholders. Governments worldwide intervened through the promulgation of 
rules, regulations, accounting standards, corporate governance codes, and securities listing rules and regulations 
to mention a few. The new corporate environment raises a lot of challenges and questions that are of concern to 
academics, regulators, and other stake holders. 
 Earnings management discretionary behaviour around the IPO corporate event became an important 
research area in the Malaysian corporate setting because of the following motivations. Firstly, since 
independence Malaysian economy have been steadily growing but suffered an economic crises between 1997 
and 1998 which resulted into many companies experiencing dwindling earnings. Saleh & Ahmed, (2005), report 
that, profit after tax of non-financial firms tumbled by RM3b and RM14b in 1997 and 1998 financial crises 
period respectively. Since earnings is a signal device of firm value to investors and management has 
considerable discretion in reporting earnings (Ahmad-Zaluki, et al. 2011, DuCharme, et.al. 2004), earnings 
management is expected to have been pervasively utilised during the period of uncertainty to restore investors’ 
confidence in dealing with their equity and new public offerings. Secondly, all Malaysian listed firms are 
governed by the same legal, economic and accounting regimes but they were subject to different listing 
requirements and supervisory monitoring depending on whether they are listed on Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia, the Second Board or NASDAQ (now ACE) markets. With less stringent rules and regulation on the 
second board companies are likely to be more involved in earnings management. However the two boards have 
now been merged since 3rd August, 2009 but still relevant as the period of existence of the second board covers 
part of our sample period.  
Thirdly the mandatory regulatory requirement that all IPO firms must provide profit forecast in their 
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prospectus and guarantee of meeting 90% of the forecasted profit for at least three years following the IPO is yet 
another motivation for earnings management to enable firms to meet the required bench mark. However the 
profit guarantee was relaxed in 1999 due to unenforceability and outright noncompliance (Wan-Hussin, 2006) 
but the profit forecast requirement remained enforced until 2008. In addition there is also provision for three-
year share moratorium (share lockup).  This is a fertile regulatory hook that may compel IPO companies to 
manage earnings. Malaysia is therefore a tempting ground for academic research in IPO and earnings 
management due to its unique corporate settings. 
Malaysia corporate environment have recently witnessed the tightening of regulations, the mandatory 
requirement to provide profit forecast in IPO prospectus, profit guarantee is now abolished, share moratorium 
now extended to both Main and ACE markets, merging of the Main Board with the Second Board into a single 
unified board called the Main Market (thereby strengthening and tightening listing requirements), the 
transforming of the Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) Market to 
Access, Certainty And Efficiency (ACE) Market, Corporate Governance reforms (CG reforms), introduction of 
accounting standards etc., all these are tighter regulatory initiatives introduced to curb earnings management 
discretionary behaviour and ensure the Malaysian capital market remain an attractive platform for local and 
foreign companies (Bank Negara annual report 2010 and Economic Report, 2009/2010).  
That said, given the increasing interest in earnings management practices, recent research finds 
evidence that stronger regulation has a direct impact on managers’ tendency to choose between real or accrual 
earnings discretionary behaviour. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) provide evidence that the level of real earnings 
discretionary behaviour increases after accounting standards are strengthened. The evidence of Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, (2005) was further re-enforced by Cohen & Zarowin, (2008). They investigated the effect of the 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on earnings management practices and documented that United States 
companies switch from accrual-discretionary behaviour pre-SOX, to real activity discretionary behaviour post-
SOX. This evidence suggests that more stringent regulation mitigates accrual-based earnings management 
leading to greater use of real earnings discretionary behaviour. It is therefore tempting to believe that Malaysian 
IPO firms must have switched over from accrual to real activity manipulation which partly accounts for the 
inconsistent research findings in the few studies on accrual management notably, Abdul- Rahman et al. (2005), 
Rahman & Ali, (2006) and Ahmed-Zaluki et al. (2011). While the former study, confirms pre IPO earnings 
management but could not find any evidence of earnings management in the post IPO period. The later study 
even though provided evidence of income increasing earnings management discretionary behaviour during the 
IPO  but was only pervasive during the 1997/98 financial crises. Both studies did not examine real activity 
discretionary behaviour thereby creating a literature gap. 
In the high concentrated and closely held ownership environment like Malaysia, ownership control may 
be an important issue. Concerns about retaining post-IPO control suggest a potential positive relationship 
between earnings management and retained ownership. Although Leyland & Pyle (1977) was one of the earliest 
studies on ownership retention which was further developed to include earnings management in a multivariate 
model developed by Fan (2007). These studies never investigated real activity discretionary behaviour. In the 
Malaysia the only study on the associated between earnings management and ownership retention by Ahmed 
Zaluki et al (2011) was based on accrual as the only earnings management proxy thereby creating a further 
literature gap 
Fields, et.al. (2001), provided evidence that investigating only accrual or real earnings management 
technique individually rather than contemporaneously cannot give a clear cumulative impact of earnings 
management discretionary behaviour. In particular, if managers use real activities manipulation and accrual-
based earnings management as substitutes for each other, examining either type of earnings management 
activities in isolation cannot lead to definitive conclusions. Furthermore studies on management earning forecast 
in IPO firms’ prospectus in Malaysia (which was a mandatory requirement up to August 2008) continue to report 
earnings forecast errors e.g. (Jelic, Saadouni, & Briston, (2001), 24.38%, 1998, (33.37%); Ismail & Weetman, 
(2007), reports -14.12%, Securities Commission, 2005, reports that 72% of companies reported deviations 
exceeding 20% while Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, (2010), reported -+10% etc., which is an indication that 
Malaysian IPOs firms still engage in EM practices contrary to existing research evidence based on accrual 
manipulation. This further provides support that perhaps Malaysian IPOs have resorted to real activity 
manipulation due to tightening of regulations instead of accrual manipulation to avoid detection by auditors and 
regulators. Despite increasing significance of companies earnings management discretionary behaviour, there 
appears to be no studies in the Malaysian emerging market that examined the direction, magnitude and nature of 
real activity manipulation and accrual-based earnings management contemporaneously in the context of the 
initial public offering corporate event. This paper therefore, is intended to fill in this research deficiency. 
 
1.2   Motivation 
From the various earnings management incentives in Malaysian IPOs enumerated above it is tempting for 
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managers to utilise incentives depending on the period around the IPO. Secondly, the competing and opposing 
issues are that, IPO issuers (shareholders) are inclined to take actions that will increase their share issue price 
before the IPO to increase their gains as well as the value of the company. Thirdly, the incentives are constrained 
by the capital market scrutiny through auditors, regulators, and analysts in the period around IPO. These 
notwithstanding, shareholders want to increase post IPO stock price in order to increase the value of their shares 
after the share moratorium period to maximize their wealth. Insiders therefore have interest in opportunistically 
using accounting discretion around IPO. 
Furthermore, in setting the share price, earnings are given prominence and seen as the most important 
and in many instances as the only valuable accounting item in prior literature in both real and accrual 
management studies (see Gunny, 2010, Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen & Zarowin, (2010), Teoh, et.al. 1998b). 
Contrary to this general believe, Guo, et.al. (2005), asserts that individual accounting items are value relevant 
and not just as a means to an end for higher earnings. In essence the individual accounting items can be 
influenced by real activities management. For instance in finance literature, selling, general and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) is perceived as an investment for future benefits and growth of the firm rather than seen as an 
increase in discretionary expenses purely from accounting perspective. Similarly research and development 
(R&D) in some industries like pharmaceutical is for future revenue growth and profit. These accounting line 
items are valued by investors for their own sake rather than their impact on earnings. Companies differ 
depending on investment strategy, profitability, or growth prospects. Therefore, investors value accounting items 
that are specific to the company, for instance while managers and investors in profitable firms prefer high 
income, loss companies have to demonstrate their net worth through sales. 
 Consequently, as earlier pointed out, study by Graham et.al.(2005) confirms that due to greater scrutiny 
managers prefer real earnings management (REM) over accruals-based earnings management (AEM), because 
these techniques are less likely to be detected by regulators, analysts, or auditors. In summary, the more the 
scrutiny, the stronger the motivation for using real activity management instead of accrual management as 
confirmed in the study by Cohen and Zarowin (2010). Pronounced scrutiny is present around IPO and prior 
literature usually does not test for REM around IPOs, but this is essential since AEM and REM can be used as 
substitutes and not coercively as complements (Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Cohen & Zarowin, 2008, and Zang, 
2012). Therefore, a closer look at different operating figures should give deeper insight into the discretion of 
companies going public. 
In the years around IPOs there are apparent dissimilarities between companies in different business 
sectors. Usually, studies of earnings management combine various industries in one sample. However, they 
differ in having distinct company characteristics like age, leverage, capitalization, industry etc. Hence, the 
incentives of companies and the corresponding financial reporting goals are not only different but sometimes 
diametrically opposed to each other. Taking all these perspectives into consideration can clarify the opacity of 
incentives and resulting earnings management around IPOs. While prior literature has already addressed many 
specific issues, there are some aspects that deserve further attention especially in emerging markets. The finance 
and accounting literature rarely differentiates between different incentives around the issue and interests of 
issuers in various industries concerning accounting numbers or line accounting items. This study intends to close 
that literature deficiency by examining the association between ownership retention (a unique feature IPO in 
Malaysia) and earnings management around the time of IPOs in Malaysian emerging market. The paper provides 
new evidence and insights about the discretionary behaviour around the IPO when different incentives are 
present. Additionally, our examination of real activity discretionary behaviour helps to distinguish between the 
results of prior research where contradictory outcomes exist based on accrual methodology in the Malaysian 
emerging market. Hence, the awareness of capital market participants can be enhanced and information 
asymmetry reduced. The outcome provides academics, investors, analysts, and regulators with a better 
understanding of discretionary behaviour around IPO event. This paper is divided into five sections: first is the 
introduction as above, the second section reviews the literature and section three is the methodology. Findings 
and discussions are in section four and section five reports the conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2 Hypotheses Development 
There are some few studies that investigated earnings management in Malaysian IPOs. These include Ahmed-
Zaluki et.al. (2011) which confirms evidence of pervasive earnings management only during the Asian economic 
crises and Abdul Rahman and Wan Abdullah (2005) that confirms evidence of earnings management before 
public listing but found no relationship between prior earnings management and post issue stock performance. 
These studies used accrual earnings management strategy as a proxy for earnings management. However accrual 
earnings management discretionary behaviour is only one aspect of measuring discretionary behaviour. Real 
earnings manipulation which is capable of providing explanation of specific discretionary behaviour in real 
aspect was never investigated. Roychowdhury (2006) is one of the first studies to examine real activity 
discretionary behaviour and focuses on real activity management with regards to meeting certain earnings bench 
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mark. The study provided evidence that firms try to avoid losses through sales management, employing 
overproduction to lower cost of goods sold (COGS), and reducing discretionary expenses to improve their profit. 
Three empirical methods to detect real activities were developed. The first is a model for the normal level of 
operating cash flow. The abnormal amount should indicate sales management by price discounts. The second 
model includes production costs, and the third, tests for abnormal discretionary expenses. These three aggregate 
accounting items were used as the only indicators of discretionary behaviour without looking at the individual 
components of the aggregate measures. Furthermore the study focuses on earnings for its own sake while other 
accounting items are only a means to an end. In other words, the purpose of real activities is to influence 
earnings, usually in the upward direction. Nevertheless, an interesting aspect is the fact that investors do not 
merely focus on earnings around IPOs, but include additional financial items for valuation purposes. More 
precisely, real activities influence certain line items other than earnings. For instance certain expense accounts 
serve as a signal of future benefit for loss firms and are considered important by investors particularly in an IPO 
setting. Another interesting aspect is that Roychowdhury (2006) controls for industry differences as well as 
growth of firms and identifies both of them as influencing variables. However, using a cross-sectional overall 
sample as a mixed industry approach does not examine differences in specific industries nor does it include 
changes of items after the specific corporate event. In addition, focusing on earnings as the outcome of the three 
measures would neglect effects of other accounting items on capital market participants around IPOs.  
Gunny (2010) examines accruals earnings management discretionary behaviour   and real activities 
management with respect to influence on future performance concerning earnings benchmarks. The study adds 
selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) and gain on asset sales as additional measures of real 
activities. It also introduces expected direction of discretionary behaviour in certain accounting items like 
research and development (R&D) and provided evidence that companies just meeting earnings benchmarks 
reduce R&D and SG&A to increase income, lower prices to inflate sales, and overproduce to decrease cost of 
goods sold (COGS). Here again as in Roychowdhury (2006), the focus of discretionary behaviour rests on the 
resulting earnings. In an IPO environment, this neglects the fact that real activity measures could have a value by 
themselves for capital market participants. For instance as mentioned earlier if an organization have history of 
innovation through successful product development as a result of R&D activities, increase in research and 
development expense is a positive signal to investors instead of categorizing it as a mere expense account. Then, 
it would no longer be a means to an end but valuable in itself. This is similarly true for SG&A which is seen as 
an investment in growth and future profitability in the financial manager’s perspective. 
 Cohen and Zarowin (2010) adopted a multi-dimensional approach. They examine accrual-based and 
real activity management at seasoned equity offerings (SEO). The study employed the three measures of 
Roychowdhury (2006) plus discretionary accruals. They find that firms engage in accruals as well as real 
activities management. The usage of these measures depends on the associated costs. The authors contribute to 
the discovery of a combination of accruals and real activity management at seasoned equity offering (SEO) with 
varying magnitude and time. Assessing SEOs and associated incentives is valuable since capital market events 
give good insights for researchers and practitioners. Similar to Roychowdhury (2006), the emphases is on 
earnings as a means to an end. Overall, it remains an empirical question whether discretionary behaviour in 
several line items is present around IPOs setting and differs over time as well as by industries. Given the 
seemingly limited research examining earnings management practices contemporaneously (real and accrual) in 
Malaysia and in accordance with prior-research on multiple earnings management practices we shall investigate 
empirically whether Malaysian IPO firms engage in real and accrual earnings management practices and 
therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: IPO firms in Malaysia engage in both real and accrual earnings management practices around IPO period. 
H1b: There is a significance difference between earnings management proxies among the industrial sectors in 
terms of nature, direction and quantum.  
 
2.1 Ownership Retention 
In the high concentrated and closely held ownership environment like Malaysia, ownership control may be an 
important issue. Concerns about retaining post-IPO control suggest a potential positive relationship between 
earnings management and retained ownership. While control retention is generally an important issue in IPO 
decisions (Brau and Fawcett, 2006 and Alavi et al., 2008), it is particularly likely that, in a closely held 
ownership environment such as Malaysia, pre-IPO owners are concerned about the potential loss of control 
following the partial transfer of ownership (Nagata & Hachiya, 2006 and Leuz, et al. 2003). One way to alleviate 
such concerns is to allocate shares to many small investors through underpricing, thereby reducing both the 
threat of takeover and the monitoring by large block holders (Ahmed-Zaluki et al 2011). Companies in which 
post-IPO retained ownership is relatively low are likely to be more concerned about loss of control and outside 
monitoring. Hence, they are more likely to manage earnings conservatively to reduce the IPO offer price; ensure 
a high initial return and oversubscription, to enable greater share allocation to smaller investors. This implies a 
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positive relationship between earnings management and retained ownership. Evidence of large-scale 
underpricing in Malaysia as reported in Jelic, et al. (2001) is consistent with this argument. The competing 
earnings management incentives in Malaysian context make it complex and difficult to predict the relationship 
between earnings management and retained ownership. We therefore hypothesize that:  
H2 There is a systematic relationship between ownership retention and real and accrual earnings management 
practices in Malaysian IPO firms. 
 
3 Methodology 
The sample consists of 476 companies that made an IPO and subsequently listed on Bursa Malaysia during the 
period 2002 to 2013. This period is devoid of any cofounding effects of the Asian financial crises of 1997/98. In 
addition the deregulation and liberalisation of Malaysian stock exchange took place during this period. For IPO 
Company to be selected into the sample, it must satisfy the following conditions: The offer should involve 
ordinary shares only, preference shares, debentures and loan stocks were excluded; listings through introduction 
were also excluded. The company must be listed on the Main Board, the Second Board or MESDAQ (ACE) 
markets of Bursa Malaysia and availability of financial data on Standard and Poor (S&P), Capital IQ data base 
from 2002-2013. This is the period when all listed companies on Bursa Malaysia started mandatory adoption of 
the Malaysian corporate governance code (MCGC) provisions in their annual reports.  Companies from the 
Finance, Trust, or Closed-End Funds sector which are regulated through the Banking and Financial Institutions 
act 1989 were excluded because they have different statutory requirements in preparing companies annual 
reports and disclosure rules. Finally companies with change in financial year were also excluded. Since our 
analysis is going to cover the three years share moratorium period and at least two years post share moratorium 
period we need at least five years financial statement to analyse the data. Our analysis will therefore cover the 
period 2002-2009. After the screening exercise the final sample that met the criteria stood at 253 IPO firms. 
However for ownership data the sample was further reduced to 221 due to lack of ownership data. 
 
3.1 Measuring accrual and real earnings management (AEM) 
In accordance with the trend in previous earnings management studies, the Dechow et al., (1995) Jones cross-
sectional modified model will be used to calculate accrual discretionary behaviour (DuChame et al. 2001, 2004, 
Roosenboom et al. 2003, Teoh et al. 1998 and Ahmed- Zaluki et al. 2011).Details of these calculations are in 
Appendix.A1-A1.5. To measure real earnings the Dechow et.al (1998) models employed in previous studies 
were adopted. These include: abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO), abnormal discretionary expenses and 
its individual accounting items namely: abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses, research and 
development and advertising. Thirdly are the abnormal production cost and its components viz:  abnormal cost 
of goods sold and abnormal change in inventory. Previous studies, Zang (2012) and Gunny (2006), support the 
evidence of the construct validity of the models and their proxies.  These models and proxies were also applied 
by, Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin, (2010), and, Zang (2012). The details of the models adopted are 
as detailed in Appendix: A2 (A2.1-A2.4) 
 
3.2 Real and Accrual Earnings and Ownership Retention 
To test the relationship between real and accrual earnings management and Ownership Retention the following 
regression equation is used: 
= + + +   
To actually test whether earnings management behaviour is different in various settings firm specific 
characteristics found from previous studies to impact on real and accrual  discretionary behaviour were 
controlled. These factors include: age, auditors, leverage, sizes, and capital expenditure growth (Ahmad-Zaluki, 
et al. 2011). 
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Table 1.1 Variable Measurement 
Variables Measurement/Operationalization Sign  
Independent 
Ownership 
Retention 
(RTOWN) as 
in Fan (2007) 
 
 
Percentage of shares retained by insiders (original owners) after the IPO. Measured 
by ,  
 
 
average  
 
 
 
+tive/ 
-tive 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Earnings 
Management 
measures 
(EM) 
 
 
(1) Discretionary Accrual (AEM) (modified Jones model as in Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney 1995) 
(2) Real Earnings (REM): (as applied in Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen et al 
2010, and Zang 2012) 
(a) abnormal cash flow from operations (sales) 
 (b)abnormal discretionary expenses (R&D,SG&A,Adverts) 
 (c)Production cost 
 (a +b+c= Aggregate REM) 
 
Positive 
Negative 
Control 
Variables 
AUDITOR 
 
 
dummy variable = 1 if auditor is Big 5 (Arthur Andersen, Deloittes, Ernst and 
Young, KPMG, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, or their pre-merger equivalents) and zero 
otherwise; 
-
negative 
LEVERAGE:  total borrowings as a percentage of total assets, at the time of the IPO; -
negative 
SIZE (SIZE) Measured as the natural log of assets to control for size effect -/+ 
AGE  Measured as the natural log of 1+IPO firm age  
Capital 
Expenditure 
Growth 
(CapGWTH 
Capital expenditure during the IPO Year minus Capital expenditure in the previous 
year scaled by total assets 
-
negative 
 
4 Findings and Discussion 
We shall start our analysis of discretionary behaviour around IPO with descriptive statistics for the whole sample.  
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Whole Sample 
EM  Mean Median        
T.-test      p 
     S.D Minimum Maximum 
DA 0.29** -0.01 2.175 .030 4.33 -18.95 34.47 
DCFO -0.03 0.01 -1.031 .303 1.03 -5.98 4.92 
DSGA 0.06*** 0.02 3.129 .002 0.59 -2.66 3.49 
DCOGS 2.75*** 0.06 6.286 .000 14.34 -1.84 131.93 
DINVT 0.02** 0.01 2.504 .012 0.27 -1.99 1.63 
DPROD 2.12*** 0.41 8.023 .000 8.17 -7.52 66.92 
DDISEXP 0.38*** 0.11 10.543 .000 1.12 -0.08 9.12 
REM 1.64*** 0.19 6.902 .000 7.33 -10.78 59.20 
Notes: All the discretionary earnings management proxies are winsorized at1% and 99% to avoid the influence 
of outliers. DA=Abnormal discretionary accruals, DCFO= Abnormal cash flow from operations, DSGA= 
Abnormal selling, general administrative expenses, DCOGS= Abnormal cost of goods sold, DINVT= Abnormal 
change in inventory, DPROD= Abnormal production cost, DISCEXP=Abnormal discretionary expenses, REM= 
Aggregate real earnings management.
From Table 1.2, the results of T-test for all earnings management discretionary proxies indicates a 
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significant result (p-values = < 0.05) at 1% level except for: (DCFO t=-1.031 p= 0.303). This is prima per se 
evidence that Malaysian IPO firms manage their earnings using both real and accrual earnings management 
discretionary behaviour which is consistent with the findings in Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012) and 
(Graham et. al. 2005). However from the above table the median values for discretionary accrual was negative (-
0.01) while all the real activity proxies have positive medians. Perhaps due to tightening of regulations and in 
order to escape detection by regulators, managers might have reverted to real earnings management and this 
might explain the income decreasing accrual earnings management discretionary behaviour. 
Table 1.3 is the descriptive statistics of various accounting items in the post IPO period according to 
industries. The mean discretionary (abnormal) figures for the various earnings management proxies are the 
means and percentages after dividing by total lagged assets to give meaning to the figures and allow comparison 
between various industries to determine the earnings management quantum and direction. The distribution of 
discretionary behaviour in terms of magnitude across the sectors is quite revealing. The mean total accruals for 
the material (-1692), information technology (-0.7), and telecommunication services (-366) sectors are all 
negative while the rest of the sectors have positive mean total accrual 
Table 1.3:  Descriptive Statistics of the Sampled IPO Companies According to Industrial Sectors 
Variable Energy Mat. Indust. Con. Step Con. Disc. Health-Care Inf. Tech. Telecom. services 
TACC. 32 -1692 25 9.33 3 6 -0.7 -366 
TASSETS 501 270 398 250 269 166 91 8100 
REVENUE 372 1232 156 170 234 135 97 4555 
%REVENUE 74 456 39 68 87 81 107 56 
DA 2.03 0.42 0.53 -0.27 -0.12 -0.09 0.31 -1.26 
%DA 0.41 0.16 0.13 -0.17 -0.03 -0.05 0.34 -0.01 
DCFO -0.28 0.11 0.08** -0.07 0.21** 0.31** -0.31** 0.40 
%DCFO -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.19 -0.33 0.20 
DSGA -0.03 0.18** -0.07** 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.15** -0.05 
%DSGA -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.16 0.00 
DISCEXP 0.54 0.16 0.27 0.20 0.38 0.42** 0.52** 6.02** 
%DISCEXP 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.46 0.08 
DCOGS 2.31 4.17** 2.28** 2.66** 0.60 0.81 2.30 26.08 
%DCOGS 0.46 1.54 0.57 1.12 0.59 0.49 2.57 0.22 
DINVT 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.1 -0.01 0.14 
%DINVT 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.00 
DPROD 1.38 2.80 3.00** 0.71 0.75 0.76 1.88 13.55 
%D PROD 0.28 1.04 0.75 0.27 0.28 0.46 1.80 0.18 
REM 0.96** 2.41** 2.62** 0.74 0.2 -0.01 1.50 4.40 
%REM 0.19 0.89 0.66 0.53 0.07 -0.01 1.57 0.06 
Notes: Total assets (TASSETS), and Revenue are average amounts in million RM in the post IPO period. The 
percentages of discretionary variables are percentages of total assets in respective industries to control for size 
and give meaning to magnitude of discretionary behaviour. All other variables are as previously defined. 
In terms of quantum and direction of abnormal accrual discretionary behaviour, Energy (+2.03, %DA 
0.41), Industrial (+0.53, %DA 0.13), Materials (+0.42, %DA 0.16) and Information technology (+0.31, %DA 
0.34) sectors dominates other sectors in terms of income increasing positive accruals. On the other hand 
Consumer Staple, Consumer Discretionary, Health care and telecommunication services sectors have negative 
accruals or income decreasing abnormal accrual discretionary behaviour.  
It is quite revealing that the entire sectors are engaged in positive or income increasing real activity 
discretionary behaviour with the telecommunication services sector having the highest aggregate real activity 
management (REM 4.77, %REM 0.06), Industrial (REM2.62, %REM0.66), Material (REM2.41, %REM 0.89), 
and Information Technology (REM 1.43, %REM 1.57). Similarly all the other sectors have positive aggregate 
real activity discretionary behaviour except the Health care sector.  It is quite revealing that the health sector has 
a negative (REM -0.01, %REM -0.1), which seems to suggest earnings management discretion is on the decline 
in the sector. Perhaps due to increased surveillance of regulatory agencies on these sectors they have now 
engaged more in real activity discretionary behaviour. The prevalence of foreign and institutional investors in the 
sector may also be a contributory factor. 
On the basis of individual accounting items, discretionary cost of goods sold (COGS) is very high and 
positive across industries emphasizing its importance as an accounting item on its own right and not just 
restricted to the manufacturing sector. However the combined measure of discretionary abnormal production 
DPROD is positive and high in Industrial, Material, Energy, and telecommunications services sectors but very 
low in consumer staple and consumer discretionary, which is expected since these sectors are not engaged in 
manufacturing. The ambiguity on the relevance of abnormal production beyond manufacturing sector is based on 
the fact that price discounts and overproduction can both account for discretionary abnormal high production 
cost in relation to sales. Price discounts can be offered by both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms to 
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boost sales revenue and in this respect abnormal production cost is applicable to non-manufacturing firms but 
admittedly overproduction is only peculiar to manufacturing concerns and that explains why abnormal 
production cost is higher in industrial, material and energy sectors. Secondly high stock of inventories and 
receivables are correlated positively with the ability of managers to engage in real activity behaviour that could 
lead to high discretionary abnormal production cost (Roychowdhury 2006). 
From the above table also discretionary change in inventory another component of production cost that 
is more applicable to the manufacturing is negative in Information Technology sector and infinitesimal in other 
sectors (which are non- inventory carrying sectors) except in industrial and material sectors. Selling general and 
administrative expenses (SG&A) are high and positive in Material, Consumer Staple and information technology 
sectors. This is not surprising because these are high growth sectors in Malaysia and it is believed in finance 
literature that SG&A expenditure is an investment in growth since it implies future revenue even though the 
accounting literature believes companies reduce SG&A to improve earnings and cash flow to influence investors 
(Gunny 2010). However the SG&A in the Industrial, Consumer Discretionary and Energy sectors is negative. 
This is quite intuitive because the aggregate discretionary expenses (DISCEXP) of which SG&A is a part is high 
and positive in all sectors which further justify examination of individual discretionary accounting items. The 
telecommunication services exercise the highest discretionary behaviour using discretionary expenses (DISEXP 
6.25, %DISCEXP 0.08) and all other sectors are equally engaged in increasing real activity behaviour using this 
accounting item.  
 
4.1 Magnitudes, Nature and Direction of Earnings Management  
Table 1.4 presents the time series profile of median and mean values of real and accrual earnings management 
proxies around IPO for the period +1 to +5 in the year of the IPO.  The results indicate significant positive mean 
discretionary accruals in the IPO year +1 and +2 which is consistent with income increasing accrual earnings 
management taking advantage of the IPO year. 
Table 1.4 IPO Yearly Distribution of Accrual and Real Earnings Management Proxies 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 
Discretionary Accruals  (DA),         
Median 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02** 
Mean 1.69*** 0.03 -0.20** -0.11** -0.04** 
Abnormal Cash Flow From Operations (DCFO)      
Median -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Mean -0.01 -0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.08 
Abnormal SG&A                         
Median 0.01 0.11*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03 
Mean 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 
Abnormal Cost of Goods Sold(COGS)       
Median -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.07 
Mean 2.50 2.88 1.58 3.51*** 3.28 
Abnormal Inventory (DINVT)       
Median 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Abnormal Production(DPROD)       
Median 0.29 0.32 0.49** 0.49 0.39 
Mean 1.72 2.21 1.93*** 2.70*** 1.99 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (DISCEXP      
Median 0.09 0.01 0.12** 0.15 0.11 
Mean 0.33 0.37 0.29** 0.55*** 0.36 
Aggregate Real Earnings Management (REM)       
Median 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.22 0.19 
Mean 1.31 1.65 1.47 2.08** 1.69 
Notes: Differences in means are tested using Mann-Whitney U, test and differences in medians are tested using 
Kruskal-Wallis median Test. To avoid undue influence of outliers all continues financial data and the 
discretionary earnings management proxies are winsorized at 1% and 99%. ** Significant at p< 0.05 level (2-
tailed).*** Significant at p< 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Significant at p< 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
It is tempting to believe that the intention is to influence IPO pricing in the IPO year (+1) and the 
discretion may as well extend to post IPO pricing. The negative coefficient immediately after the IPO in year +3 
through to year +5 indicate income decreasing accrual based earnings management which may be as a result of 
reversal of accruals and intensity of regulatory surveillance. It could be recalled that the Malaysian corporate 
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governance reporting requirements became mandatory for listed companies on Bursa Malaysia in 2002. Another 
reason may be due to accrual reversals as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, there is increasing significant 
real activity from the IPO year +1 up to year +5 which is an indication that IPO firms utilise both accrual and 
real activity discretionary behaviour around the IPO period and there is also some evidence of trade-off between 
accrual and real activity discretionary One of the possible reasons for reversion to real activity management in 
year +3 to +5 may be that managers are eager to meet the earnings forecasts requirement in the prospectus of at 
least 90% of forecasted amount up to two years following the IPO. This is a unique mandatory requirement in 
Malaysian environment until 2008 when it was abolished. These findings are in tandem with the findings of 
Zaluki-Ahmed et al. (2011) that accruals reverse three years beyond the IPO year. Earlier studies (Abdulrahman 
and Wan- Abdullah 2005, Morsfield and Tan 2006, Fan 2007, Roosenboom et al. 2003)   and the pioneer studies 
of Teoh et al. (1998a) and Friedlan (1994) find evidence that IPO firm manage earnings upwards using accrual 
based earnings management before and after the IPO year. This however, is in sharp contrast with the findings of 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) that IPO firms report conservatively around the IPO event to escape scrutiny by 
regulators. 
 Furthermore the significant positive coefficient in abnormal production and aggregate real earnings 
management is consistent with real earnings management discretionary behaviour. In year +1 through to year +4 
there is evidence of significant and positive coefficients of real activity management. This shows that Malaysian 
IPO firms pervasively engage in real activity management during and after the IPO period. This is a prima per se 
evidence that IPO firms have reverted to real activity management in line with findings in previous studies 
(Graham et al 2005, Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Zang 2013, and Roychowdhury 2006). There is however a 
decline in real activity management four years after the IPO corporate event even though the median values 
remain positive and significant. This again is in sharp contrast with the findings of Zaluki-Ahmed et al. (2011) 
that no evidence of pervasive earnings management was found in the post IPO period which is not surprising 
since real activity discretionary behaviour was not investigated. In the year +4, there was a decline in the real and 
accrual discretionary behaviour which may be because o reduced incentives of major shareholders and insiders 
to engage in earnings management discretionary behaviour due to expiration of the share moratorium period.  
 
4.2 Distribution of earnings management proxies by year of listing  
To further investigate hypothesis H1a that Malaysian IPO firms are involved in accrual and real earnings 
management discretionary behaviour during the IPO corporate event, Table1. 6 is the distribution of earnings 
management proxies by year of listing for the 12 years sample period (2002-2013). Since the proxies have been 
winsorized to remove the effect of extreme values and outliers the mean values are used to draw inferences. The 
results of Kruskal Wallis test of equality of means for the whole sampled years shows: (DA H1 (11) = 16.91 p = 
0.11, DCFO H (11) = 24.58 p = 0.011, DSGA H (11) =34.87 p = 0.000, DCOGS H (11) = 20.22 p = 0.043, 
DPROD H (11) = 22.770 p = 0.019, DISCEXP H (11) = 20.210 p = 0.0425. These indicate there is significant 
difference in accrual and real earnings management discretionary behaviour over the years 
Table 1 5: Discretionary behaviour in quantum nature and direction based on year of listing 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Proxy Mean median mean median Mean median mean median mean median mean Median 
DA 2.54 0.02 1.13 0.06 1.33 0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 
DCFO -0.15 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
DSGA -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.15a 0.03 0.03 0.02 1.11 0.03 
DCOGS 0.87 0.03 3.57b 0.01 0.95 0.10 2.73a 0.00 1.55 0.02 1.44 -0.02 
DINVT 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02c 0.00 0.04a 0.00 
DPROD -0.05 0.18 1.42 0.28 0.93 0.27 2.17 0.43 1.82 0.28 1.65b 0.50 
DISCEXP 0.22 0.09 0.34 0.07 2.28b 0.01 0.45 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.32c 0.10 
REM -0.09 0.18 1.13 0.15 0.71 0.18 1.66c 0.25 1.53 0.10 1.27 0.33 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Proxy Mean median mean median Mean media mean median mean median mean Median 
DA -.15c -0.06 0.27c -0.04 -0.19 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -.12c 0.02 0.04 0.03 
DCFO 0.00 0.02 0.04c 0.03 -.05b 0.06 0.26b 0.05 -.46c 0.00 -0.32 0.00 
DSGA 0.08 0.04 .11b 0.03 0.03c 0.00 0.21a -0.03 -.08a -0.01 -.18a 0.00 
DCOGS 1.04 0.02 5.50a 0.16 6.81a 0.19 6.60a 0.39 8.80a 0.32 3.55a 0.65 
DINVT 0.05c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04c 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.08b 0.00 
DPROD 2.48b 0.40 1.98 0.27 3.48b 0.62 5.39a 0.82 4.55a 0.64 5.85a 1.13 
DISCEX 0.38c 0.13 0.64c 0.13 0.45 0.13 0.36b 0.19 0.62b 0.15 0.75b 0.33 
REM 2.07a 0.12 1.18 0.11 2.19b 0.19 4.64a 0.41 3.52c 0.13 5.43b 1.23 
Notes: All the discretionary earnings management proxies are winsorized at1% and 99% to avoid the influence 
                                                 
1 The test statistic H is calculated as: H= where RI is the sum of ranks from each group, N is the 
sample size and ni  is the sample size of a particular group even though groups may have equal size. 
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of outliers. DA=Abnormal discretionary accruals, DCFO= Abnormal cash flow from operations, DSGA= 
Abnormal selling, general administrative expenses, DCOGS= Abnormal cost of goods sold, DINVT= Abnormal 
change in inventory, DPROD= Abnormal production cost, DISCEXP=Abnormal discretionary expenses, REM= 
Aggregate real earnings management. a, b, c  
For us to ascertain the particular years that are significantly different, a follow up was conducted using 
Mann-Whitney U tests pairwise mean comparison over the years. Effect size1 is calculated and reported in order 
to have standardised measure of the size of the effect observed for comparison with previous studies. Mann 
Whitney U test pairwise comparison of the earnings management proxies based on year of listing from 2002-
2013 above indicates that, there is no any significant difference in the mean ranks of the discretionary earnings 
management proxies as p-value > 0.05 in the period: 2002-2007. There was however a significant difference in 
2002 vs. 2007 in DPROD (Mean= 1.65, P= 0.038 U= 1224 Z=-2.079, n=163 and effect size r = -0.16), the mean 
ranks are: (24, 139) respectively.  In 2002 to 2011 there was a significant mean rank difference in DISCEXP, 
DCFO, and DPROD –real earnings management proxies. The results overall shows there is pervasive real and 
accrual earnings management discretionary behaviour around the IPO corporate event in Malaysia and the 
evidence indicate significant difference between the listing years further supporting our earlier findings in 
support of hypothesis H1. The next section shall investigate hypothesis H1b as to whether there is any significant 
difference, in the earnings management discretionary proxies by industrial sectors 
Overall in accordance with the prediction of our hypothesis H1b, the result suggests there is significant 
mean difference in earnings management behaviour of IPO firms according to industrial sectors. It is revealing 
that, there is no significant difference in accrual earnings discretionary behaviour perhaps due to the trade off 
with real activity management discretionary behaviour. The energy, industrial and material sectors are 
significantly and positively different from other sectors in aggregate real earning discretionary behaviour. It is 
however not surprising because these are high growth sectors in Malaysian economy. The abnormal production 
cost is positively significantly different in the industrial sector which is expected since the sector is engaged in 
manufacturing. In term of real activity in discretionary expenses the material, consumer discretionary and staple 
sectors are positively significantly different from other sectors. 
 
5 Real and Accrual Earnings and Ownership Retention  
Table 1.6 is the mean retained ownership by the strategic or the original owners is 71% which is similar to other 
countries like US, 71% (Jain and Kini, 1994) and UK 77% (Keasey and Short, 1997) but lower in than reported 
in a more recent study in US: (Albring, et al, 2007, 55%), Thailand: (Kim, et al. 2004). Control concern appear 
to be an important issue in Malaysian concentrated market The average age of Malaysian IPO Company is 11 
years which is the same as reported in a similar study by Ahmed –Zaluki et al. (2011) in Malaysia but 
considerably lower than the 35 years reported in Roosenboom et al (2003) in there study of Dutch firms. 
 Table 1.6 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
        N Mean Median      S D Minimum Maximum 
RTNOWN 221 0.71 0.69 0.99 0 14.8 
AGE 221 11.00 8 8.43 0 38 
AUDITOR 221 0.42 0 0.49 0 1 
CAPGRWTH 221 3.94 0 20.38 -0.96 264.06 
LEVERAGE 221 0.59 0.31 2.24 -0.21 26.4 
SZE_ASSET 221 305.54 89.2 1438.36 0 17798.1 
DA 221 0.13 0 3.12 -32 8.38 
DCFO 221 -0.07 0.01 0.88 -10 2.3 
DSGA 221 0.07 0.04 0.38 -1.95 1.6 
DCOGS 221 2.48 0.27 7.32 -1.05 55.75 
DINVT 221 0.02 0 0.13 -0.35 0.98 
DPROD 221 2.06 0.58 5.35 -2.37 48.31 
DISCEXP 221 0.37 0.15 0.82 -0.03 6.82 
REM 221 1.59 0.31 4.68 -4.18 41.7 
Notes: All the discretionary earnings management proxies are winsorized at1% and 99% to avoid the influence 
of outliers. 
About 42% of the IPO companies engage the services of reputable auditors. The mean of the accrual 
earnings discretionary proxy and the abnormal real earnings proxies are all positive except abnormal cash flow 
from operations which is negative providing evidence of systematic relationship between earnings management 
                                                 
1 The effect size r is calculated by converting the Z-score into effect size estimate using the following equation following 
Rosenthal (1991: 19): r =  where z is the z-scores and N is the number of observations. 
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and ownership retention.  
 
5.1 Correlation Matrix 
Table 1.7 is a pairwise correlation matrix of retained ownership, earnings management discretionary proxies and 
the control variables. The results of the Spearman’s correlation indicate retained ownership is negatively 
correlated to all the earning’s management discretionary proxies. Although not statistically significant it 
indicates that when the level of retained ownership is high, there is low the earnings management discretionary 
behaviour which seems to support the signalling hypothesis. Similar result is indicated by Pearson’s correlation. 
For the control variables Age and auditor reputation are positively correlated to the earnings management 
discretionary proxies (similar to the findings in the Malaysian related study of Ahmed-Zaluki et, al.2011eveng 
though only accrual earnings was studied) though only abnormal behaviour in inventory (DINVT), abnormal 
production cost (DPROD), and abnormal cost of goods sold (DCOGS) are statistically significant. Leverage and 
size are statistically positively related to almost all the real earnings management discretionary proxies and the 
accrual discretionary proxy. This implies that the higher the size of the firm and leverage the higher the real and 
accrual discretionary behaviour. These findings are in sharp contrast with the study of Wan-Hussein and Ripain 
(2003) that smaller firms are engaged more in income smoothing in Malaysia. The study is however in 
agreement with the pioneer study of Aharony et al. (1993) that earnings management discretionary behaviour is 
more is in large leverage firms. 
Table 1.7 Spearman Below the Diagonal and Pearson Above the Diagonal Correlation Matrix 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
             
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
To test whether there is a systematic relationship between ownership retention and earnings management 
practices in Malaysian IPO firms (Hypothesis H4), Table 7.6 is the result of the standard error robust regression.  
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Table 1.8: Standard  Error Regression (Eicker-Huber-White  Heterokedestic hc3 Consistent) 
 DA DCFO DSGA DCOGS DINVT DPROD DISCEX REM 
RTHOWN 1.053 -.391** 0.165 -0.901 0.017 -2.763** -0.129 -2.62** 
 (-0.720) (-0.198) (-0.116) (-1.968) (-0.035) (-1.241) (-0.147) (-1.15)
AGE 0.005 0.010 0.002 -0.008 0.003*** -0.012 -0.003 -0.016 
 (-0.023) (-0.007) (-0.003) (-0.063) (-0.001) (-0.035) (-0.004) (-0.032) 
AUDITOR -0.156 .215** -0.020 1.165 0.004 0.77 0.195 0.407 
 (-0.377) (-0.102) (-0.051) (-1.314) (-0.017) (-0.712) (-0.141) (-0.578) 
CAPGWTH 2.9-06 0.002 0.001 -0.020* -0.001 -0.022** -0.001 -0.020* 
 (-0.004) (-0.001) (-0.001) (-0.012) (-0.001) (-0.011) (-0.001) (-0.010) 
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.022* -0.007*** 0.004 -8.17-05 -0.025 -0.002 -0.030 
 (-0.020) (-0.012) (-0.002) (-0.078) (-0.001) (-0.026) (-0.009) (-0.024) 
SIZE_TASS 2.06-05 1.97-1 -4.45-5 0.001 -2.98-06 0.001 6.29E-05 0.001 
 (-3.900) (-2.950) (-3.14-1) (-0.001) (-5.970) (-0.001) (-8.540) (-0.001) 
YEAR -0.111 -0.007 -0.028 0.853** 0.005 0.558** 0.0447 0.424*
 (-0.069) (-0.026) (-0.018) (-0.424) (-0.005) (-0.248) (-0.037) (-0.219) 
SECTOR -0.174 -.047** 0.034** -0.127 -0.007 -0.476** 0.0613 -.47*** 
 (-0.132) (-0.019) (-0.014) (-0.301) (-0.005) (-0.184) (-0.044) (-0.149) 
CONSTANT 223.7 14.99 56.68 -1708** -10.2 -1,114** -89.5 -845.8* 
 (-138.9) (-52.12) (-36.41) (-849.8) (-9.468) (-496.7) (-74.86) (-4380) 
OBSERVATION 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.024 0.065 0.096 0.066 0.097 0.098 0.065 0.095 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;   DA=Abnormal discretionary 
accruals, DCFO= Abnormal cash flow from operations, DSGA= Abnormal selling, general administrative 
expenses, DCOGS= Abnormal cost of goods sold, DINVT= Abnormal change in inventory, DPROD= Abnormal 
production cost, DISCEXP=Abnormal discretionary expenses, REM= Aggregate real earnings management. . 
Each column is the result of regression of the following equation for earnings management proxy named in the 
relative column: 
= + + +   
All other variables are as previously defined. 
The ownership retention (RTNOWN) is significantly negatively associated with the real earnings 
management proxies of abnormal discretionary cash flow (DCFO), abnormal production cost (DPROD), and 
aggregate real earnings (REM) confirming the findings in univariate analysis. This relationship is understandable 
since real earning discretionary behaviour affects the long run value of the firm strategic retained ownership is 
likely to constrain it to safeguard the value of their investment. However there is positive association between 
ownership retention and accrual earnings though not significant which appears to give a weak support for the 
ownership control concerns of the Malaysian investor over wealth protection and signalling hypothesis. The 
counter argument may also be that the positive relationship with discretionary accruals is consistent with owners 
of high quality firms signalling quality through underpricing shares sold at the IPO event even though share 
moratorium regulation may limit the signalling incentive through ownership retention.Consequently the pre-IPO 
owners who retain low ownership do forgo the short term wealth as a result of earnings management but ensure 
high underpricing so that the shares are oversubscribed and by Malaysian regulation this will prevent block 
holders taking the shares so that many small investors get the allocation. This ultimately reduces takeover threat 
and monitoring by institutional and other block holders which relieves the fears of low retained ownership (Alavi 
et. al.2008). Another possible explanation for the underpricing of Malaysian IPOs is that due to fixed pricing 
system of the Malaysian Capital market it is difficult for the issuers and the investors to determine the true value 
of the IPOs. This is because not all privately and publically available information is reflected in the IPO at the 
time the price is fixed (Yong, 2013). Other explanations include the bandwagon hypothesis whereby the IPO 
underpricing is used by owners to create a demand effect which subsequently results in oversubscription. Yong 
(2011) explains the band wagon effect as a possible explanation of underpricing. On the whole the relationship 
between earnings management and ownership retention in Malaysia is not apriori clear thereby confirming 
hypothesis H2. In the case of the control variables there is negative association between accrual discretionary 
behaviour and auditors which implies that high quality auditors may constrain accrual discretionary behaviour. 
This is consistent with previous studies (Zhou and Elder, 2003; Chen et al., 2005). The positive association 
between auditors and the real activity proxies though not significant is perhaps because real activity discretionary 
behaviour is hardly detected by auditors.  
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6 Summary and Conclusion  
The descriptive statistics of the earnings management proxies indicates Malaysian IPO firms engage in both 
accrual and real earning management discretionary behaviour. The descriptive statistics after decomposition of 
the sample into industrial sectors is quite revealing. In terms of direction magnitude or quantum positive (income 
increasing) discretionary accruals was highest in the energy, industrial, information technology and material 
sectors. This is not surprising since these sectors are not subjected to share moratorium regulation. On the other 
hand negative (income decreasing) discretionary accrual behaviour was highest in the consumer staple, 
consumer discretionary, healthcare and telecommunication and these industries are in the trade and services 
sector that are subjected to share moratorium regulation. This justifies the Securities Commission and Bursa 
Malaysia’s reforms in merging the boards and subjecting all IPO firms to share moratorium and the same listing 
rules and regulations. It is quite revealing that all sectors are engaged in positive real activity discretionary 
behaviour except the health sector which may be due to foreign participation in that sector. The results support 
our hypothesis H1 that Malaysian IPO firm are involved in accrual and real earnings discretionary behaviour 
around the IPO corporate event. 
 The results, according to year of listing in terms of quantum, nature and direction are quite interesting. 
The most sluggish period for IPO activities in Malaysia was in 2007-2008 perhaps due to apprehension in 
international financial market partly due to inflationary pressure arising from the catapulting of global fuel and 
commodity prices and the global financial crises, thereby slowing down global economy and investment climate. 
The IPO market in Malaysia appears to have recovered between 2008 through to 2010 for all sectors. The results 
indicate pervasive positive (income increasing) real activity discretionary behaviour from 2007 upwards and a 
significant decrease in accrual discretionary behaviour. This may be connected to the adoption of most of the 
provisions of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) in the Malaysian accounting standards in 2007 
(even though it became mandatory in January 2012).  Studies have shown the adoption of IFRS have reduced 
accrual earnings discretionary behaviour (Ball, 2006, Wan Ismail, et,al. 2013). The comparisons of means across 
the industrial sectors indicate a significant difference in real earnings management discretionary proxies across 
the industrial sectors thereby giving support to hypothesis H1b. It is recommended that regulatory authorities 
revisit reporting standards, listing rules, regulations, and corporate governance regulations to constrain real 
activity discretionary behaviour. 
For the ownership retention the pairwise univariate Spearmen’s correlation analysis indicates retained 
ownership is negatively correlated to all the earning’s management discretionary proxies. Although not 
statistically significant it indicates that the higher the retained ownership, the lower the level of earnings 
management which seems to support the signalling hypothesis. Similar result is indicated by Pearson’s 
correlation. The multivariate analysis confirms a positive association between ownership retention and accrual 
earnings though not significant which at least lend a weak support to the ownership control concerns of the 
Malaysian investor over wealth protection and signalling hypothesis. In conclusion, firms in which post-IPO 
retained ownership is relatively low are likely to be more concerned with loss of control and possible 
interference from outside monitoring. They are likely to reduce the IPO offer price, ensure a high initial return 
and oversubscription, to enable greater share allocation to smaller investors to maintain control (Ahmed Zaluki 
2011) 
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APPENDICES 
A1 Steps for Calculating Discretionary Accruals  
Step 1: Data was obtained from company financials in S&P Capital IQ data base, on the following: Total Assets 
(TASSET, Revenue or Sales (REV), Accounts Receivable (AR), Property Plant and Equipment (PPE), Change 
in inventory (INVT), Change in Revenue (DREV), Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), Selling and General 
Administrative expenses (SG&A), Research and Development (R&D), and Advertisement, Cash from 
Operations (CFO) and Return on Assets (ROA). 
 
A1.2 Step 2: Calculation of Total Accruals  
Total accruals (TA) are first calculated using the following formula as in Cohen and Zarowin (2008): 
                                                (1)  
Where TA=Total accruals, EFO=Earnings from Operations, CFO=Cash flow from operations 
 
A1.3 Step 3: Calculation of Coefficients estimates 
            (2) 
TAi,t =  total accruals for industry portfolio company i in year t   
ASSETit-1 = lagged total assets for industry portfolio company i in year t 
  ΔSALESit= change in sales for company i in year t 
 PPEit= gross value of property plant and equipment, for company i in year t; 
 ROAi t= return on assets calculated as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. 
  
 
 
A1.4 Step 4: Calculation of Non-Discretionary Accruals  
In the next step, nondiscretionary accruals are estimated for each IPO company in the sample and for each year 
using the fitted coefficients , from each annual estimation portfolio.  
NDAi, t= 1 2 3 I,t  
Where: NDAi,t =expected non-discretionary accruals for IPO company i in year t;  
∆REVit= change in receivables for IPO company i in year t; 
1, 2, 3  = are coefficients, all others are as previously defined 
 
A1.5 Step 5: Calculate Discretionary Accruals 
The resultant discretionary accruals are arrived at as estimated in equation (4): 
 (4) 
Where: DAi,t = the estimated discretionary accruals for IPO  company i in year t,  
 
 For robustness two alternative measures of Discretionary accruals as in Cohen and Zarowin (2010) are tested by 
using the following alternative regression in the first stage: 
= 1 2 3 I,t               (5) 
 
A2 Measurement of Real Earnings Management 
A2.1 Abnormal Cash Flow from operations (DCFO) 
 The normal level of cash flow from operations is calculated using the following cross sectional regression for 
each industry and year and then for industry subsectors using pre- IPO data: 
 (5)                           
Where CFOi,t = cash flows from operations for company i at year t . The abnormal CFO for IPO firms is 
calculated as the actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO calculated using the fitted coefficients from 
equation (5). 
Similar to the calculation of accrual earnings management all variables are divided by lagged total assets. 
 
A2.2 Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (DISCEXP)  
The normal level of discretionary expenses is calculated as a contemporaneous linear function of sales expressed 
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as follows: 
(6) 
 Where DISXi,t = discretionary expenses and all others variables as previously defined. 
According to (Roychowdhury, 2006)Roychowdhury (2006) and (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010)Cohen &Zarowin 
(2010)  calculating  normal level of discretionary expenses as indicted in equation  (6) above can give rise to  
inaccurate figure in a situation  of increasing sales management by the company in order to inflate earnings 
during the year. This is because it will give rise to low residuals. To solve the problem, discretionary expenses 
are calculated as a function of previous year sales. The estimation of normal level of discretionary expenses by 
Roychowdhury (2006) for the IPO industry company portfolio calculated as follows is therefore adopted: 
                                                   (7) 
Where DISXi,t  =  the sum total of SG&A, R&D, and advertising expenses for company i at period t. , SALESi,t-1 
=  the previous year sales.  
Using the estimated fitted coefficients in equation 7, the estimated normal level of discretionary expenses for the 
IPO sampled company is then calculated and subtracted from the actual discretionary expenses to obtain the 
abnormal level of discretionary expenses for IPO firms. The same procedure as in Dechow model (1998) is 
applied to calculate normal and abnormal selling and general expense account (SG&A) as specified in equation 8: 
 = + +      (8)    
Where SG&A= selling, general and administrative expenses. 
 
A2.3 Abnormal Production Cost 
The third real activity manipulation is through increasing earnings by reducing the cost of goods sold through 
overproduction of inventory or overproduction to boost sales to through discounts or lenient credit terms. 
Following Roychowdhury (2006), and Cohen & Zarowin (2010), production costs is arrived at as the sum total 
of change in inventory plus cost of goods sold. Therefore two models are used to arrive at cost of production. 
First, change in inventory is estimated using equation 9.  
(a)   +         (9) 
Secondly, cost of goods sold during the year is estimated as a linear function of contemporaneous sales as 
specified in the equation 10. 
(b)                                             (10) 
Using equations 9 and 10 normal level of production cost (a +b) was then estimated as: 
  + + + +      (11)               
Where PRODi t =sum of the cost of goods sold (COGS) +change in investment (  
The Change in inventory from lagged year to current year  
ΔSALES= the change in sale from lagged year to current year. 
The fitted values of coefficients in equation 11 are used to calculate the normal cost of production. The 
abnormal level of production costs (PROD) is calculated as the difference between actual production cost and 
normal production cost.  
  
A2.4 Aggregate Real Earnings 
 Following Cohen et al. (2010) and (Zang, 2012)Zang (2012), aggregate real earnings management discretionary 
behaviour  is calculated as the sum total of three variables constituting real earnings discretionary behaviour, 
namely: abnormal level of production cost, the abnormal level of discretionary expenses and abnormal level of 
cash flow from operations. In line with the previous literature the abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal 
cash flow from operations are multiply by -1. The essence is that the higher this two proxies are,  the more the 
possibility that  the company is engaged in manipulating sales through lowering discretionary expenses (SG&A, 
R&D, and advertising expenses) and generous discounts. The production cost proxy is not multiplied by -1 since 
higher production cost infers overproduction which consequently lowers cost of goods sold. In nut shale, the 
aggregate measure of real earnings discretionary behaviour is the aggregate standardised value of the three real 
earnings proxies. It must be conceded that the aggregate measures alone may be too parsimonious and give 
misleading result because each proxy has different consequences and implications for earnings. It is for this 
reason that the individual proxies and individual line accounting items as well as the aggregate measures are 
reported. 
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